Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is extended and analyzed, and gaps are found. Three specific protocols are described for which the entanglement cheating as given in the impossibility proof fails to work. One of these protocols, QBC2, is proved to be unconditionally secure.
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I Introduction
Quantum cryptography [1] , the study of information security systems involving quantum effects, has recently been associated almost exclusively with the cryptographic objective of key distribution. This is due primarily to the nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out QBC and other quantum protocols that have been proposed for various other cryptographic objectives [2] .
In a bit commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam would "open" the commitment: revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed bit with the evidence in her possession. The usual concrete example is for Adam to write down the bit on a piece of paper which is then locked in a safe to be given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment. The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it, and hence the bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should not be able to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a trusted third party or by invoking an unproved assumption on the complexity of certain computational problem. By utilizing quantum effects, various QBC schemes not involving a third party have been proposed that were supposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe can cheat with any significant probability of success as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a general proof on the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols were described [3] - [6] . Henceforth, it has been accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of principle [7] - [8] .
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases of equal and unequal density operators that Babe has for the two different bit values. The proof shows that if Babe's successful cheating probability P B c is close to the value 1/2, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Adam's successful cheating probability P A c is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger than the mere impossibility of unconditional security, namely that it is impossible to have both P The general questions of scope of the impossibility proof will be addressed specifically in Section IV. Three QBC schemes not covered by the impossibility proof will be described in Sections V-VII, although only one of them, QBC2 in Section VI, is proved to be unconditionally secure in this papper. The results are developed within nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, unrelated to relativistic protocols [9] or cheat-sensitive protocols [10] . The essential point is that the flow of classical information between Adam and Babe in the protocol is crucial to the possible operations they can carry out, hence fundamentally affecting the security level of the scheme. In the impossibility proof, it is basically assumed that both Adam and Babe possess full information at each stage of the protocol, an unwarranted assumption.
In Section II the impossibility proof will be reviewed. Since the issues involved in quantum cryptography, or classical cryptography for that matter, are often subtle, it is the policy of this paper to give complete proofs for its claims. Thus, the gap between the quantitative impossibility claim and the result available in the literature will be filled. An in-principle insecure protocol QBC0 is also described that underlies QBC1 and QBC3. In Section III, the impossibility proof in the original formulation is extended to cover the situation in which Babe applies a superoperator transformation to Adam's committed state before perfect verification. Another insecure protocol QBC01, related to QBC0, is described as an illustration. The reader who just wants to see an unconditionally secure QBC protocol can go directly from Section II to Section VI. Note that the results in this paper are valid in infinite-dimensional spaces. Also, the same index symbols i, j, etc., may denote different quantities in different sections.
II The Impossibility Proof
In this Section we review the standard formulation of the impossibility proof and then recast it in a form more suitable for quantitative analysis and extension, and describe a protocol QBC0. The development of this section will be used in the rest of the paper.
According to the impossibility proof, Adam would generate |Φ 0 or |Φ 1 depending on b = 0 or 1,
where the states {|φ i } and {|φ 
, the switching operation is to be obtained by using the so-called "Schmidt decomposition [11] ," the expansion of |Φ 0 and |Φ 1 in terms of the eigenstates |φ k of ρ 
By applying a unitary U A that brings {|ê k } to {|ê In addition to the above quantitative relations, the gist of the impossibility proof is supposed to lie in its generality -that any QBC protocol could be fitted into its formulation, as a consequence of various arguments advanced in [3] - [8] . Among other reasons to be elaborated in Section IV, it appeared to the present author from his development of a new cryptographic tool, anonymous quantum key technique [12] by Babe and known only to her. As a consequence, Adam would not be able to determine the cheating unitary transformation U A as in protocol QBC1, to be described in Section V after the impossibility proof is first analyzed generally.
In a QBC protocol, the {|φ i } and {|φ ′ i } are chosen so that they are concealing as evidence, i.e. Babe cannot reliably distinguish them in optimum binary hypothesis testing [13] .
(The role of quantum detection theory in QBC together with some new results used in this paper are elaborated in Appendix A). They would also be binding if Adam is honest and sends them as they are above, which he could not change after Babe receives them. Babe can always guess the bit with a probability of success P B c = 1/2, while Adam should not be able to change a committed bit at all. However, it is meaningful and common to grant unconditional security when the bestP B c Babe can achieve is arbitrarily close to 1/2 and Adam's best probability of successfully changing a committed bitP A c is arbitrarily close to zero even when both parties have perfect technology and unlimited resources including unlimited computational power [4] . To facilitate the quantitative analysis of these performance measures, the impossibility proof would first be reformulated.
Before proceeding, note the following basic property of entanglement important in QBC. See Appendix B for a proof and a discussion of its role in the impossibility of superluminal communication via quantum entanglement.
Theorem (Local
As a consequence of this theorem, Adam cannot cheat by changing the ρ
case whatever the ρ's are. In particular, a single pure state as in the example of Section I cannot be changed.
The operation of unitary transformation with subsequent measurement of an orthonormal basis is equivalent to the mere measurement of another orthonormal basis {|ẽ i } on the system. Thus, the net cheating operation can be described by writing
for a unitary matrix V defined by |e i = j V ij |ẽ j , and then measuring |ẽ i . For convenience, we may still in the rest of the paper refer to the cheating operation as a 
In general, the optimal cheating probabilityP B c for Babe is given by the probability of correct decision for optimally discriminating between two density operators ρ 
where · 1 is the trace norm, τ 1 ≡ tr(τ † τ ) 1/2 , for a trace-class operator τ [14] . In terms of a security parameter n that can be made arbitrarily large ,the statement of unconditional security (US) can be quantitatively expressed as 
Condition (US) is equivalent to the statement that for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n 0 such that for all n > n 0 ,P 
as follows. Let ρ
2 from (10). From Uhlmann's theorem, choose |Φ 0 and |Φ 1 of (1)- (2) to be the purifications that achieve the maximum
. The cheating operation on |Φ 0 is given by (5) , and
Adam's successful cheating probability is given by the following Lemma 1: For probabilities α i and complex numbers λ i ,
(the sums can be over infinite sets).
Proof: When λ i are real, (11) follows from Jensen's inequality [16] and the concavity of the function x → x 2 . The complex case follows by expanding each λ i into real and imaginary parts. 2 . Thus, the statement (IP) is proved. In particular, one has the convergence ratē
As an illustration, consider the following protocol, in which hashing via the parity function is used to make ρ (ii) Adam opens the commitment by revealing the sequence of n states. Babe verifies by measuring the corresponding projection on each qubit to see that the entire sequence is correct.
To show that this scheme can be made concealing, note that ρ
factorizes into products of individual qubit parts as follows. Let j = (j 1 , . . . , j n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , P l0 = |φ φ|,
be the even and odd parity n-bit sets. Then
and so
Thus, Babe's optimum quantum decision reduces to optimally deciding between |φ and |φ ′ for each qubit individually and then seeing whether there is an even or odd number of |φ ′ 's.
The optimum error probability p e for each qubit is given in (A5), and the optimum error probabilityP B c of correct bit decision on the sequence is, from the even and odd binomial sums (cf. Appendix C),P
Thus,P B c is close to 1 2 exponentially in n independently of 
III An Extension of the Impossibility Proof
In this Section, a protocol QBC01 will be described in which Babe introduces a lossy transformation on Adam's committed state while still being able to verify perfectly. While it may be argued that such transformation cannot succeed in obtaining a secure protocol on qualitative grounds, it may also be argued otherwise. Specifically, the coherence of the states (1)- (2) can be deliberately destroyed by Babe with such a CP map, reducing the entangled states to incoherent superpositions in her observation space. It turns out that if she does that, which she can emphatically do, the resulting condition on the number n of modes would not fit with the other requirements of the protocol. Indeed, the impossibility proof will be extended to cover all such possibilities of Babe introducing a CP-map transformation.
The following protocol is closely related to QBC0. PROTOCOL QBC01. is the Π 1 operator part of a POM for the "1" or "not 1" decision in quantum hypothesis testing as described in Appendix A, with perfect verification corresponding to the condition
The P A c then becomes
The following lemma and all other results in this paper are valid in infinite-dimensional spaces.
Lemma 2 [14] : For any bounded operator X and any trace-class operator τ ,
where · is the ordinary operator norm.
Since X B i1 ≤ 1, from (18) we get
From the original
obtains, by relating inner product and trace norm for pure states as in (A4)-(A5),
The following theorem is actually valid for any positive trace-preserving map J .
Theorem [20] :
From (20) and (21)
≤ 4ǫ and, using (11),
Putting (22) into (19) yields P A c ≥ 1 − 2 √ ǫ, completing the proof of (IP). It appears that the use of the trace norm cannot be avoided here, in contrast to the J B = I B case, which is responsible for the weakening of theP
The perfect verification condition (16) , preserved in protocol QBC01, is not necessary for a secure QBC protocol. This point and the entanglement destruction strategy of protocol QBC01 will be exploited in protocol QBC3 of Section VII. These possibilities also suggest that it is now appropriate to examine the assumptions underlying the impossibility proof.
IV The Limited Scope of the Impossibility Proof
The generality of the scope of the impossibility proof is analyzed in this section on general grounds. This is an important issue because unconditionally secure bit commitment is too useful to give up easily, and the available impossibility proof has many weaknesses that can be exploited for secure QBC protocols. At the very least, one may hope that hidden assumptions, perhaps practically valid, may be revealed. Indeed one such assumption is that the quantum and classical communications involved are over a perfect channel, which should be considered different from the assumption that the parties have perfect technology. This is a good assumption for some situations, but not others such as long-distance fiber-optic But then the relevance of such results to reality is quite questionable. In this paper, a perfect channel is granted. Since it is widely believed that there is a complete impossibility proof in such a case, I would try to show otherwise independently of the protocols of the paper.
The major problem is, of course, to decide whether the formulation given in [3] - [8] is sufficiently broad to include all possible QBC protocols. Typically, one proves general impossibility by showing that any concretely suggested possibility would lead to a contradiction.
The simplest example is that the possibility of superluminal communication via quantum entanglement would contradict local state invariance (cf. Appendix B). Another example would be the quantum no-clone theorem, where cloning contradicts unitarity on a sufficiently large Hilbert space [21] as well as quantum detection theory (cf. Appendix A). In von Neumann's famous no-hidden-variable theorem [22] , a contradiction is derived from what he considered to be the requirements for a hidden-variable theory. Perhaps more significant and illuminating is the impossibility proof of certain geometric constructions by straightedge and compass developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, in which any such construction is characterized by the membership of a certain number lying in a tower of quadratic extension fields [23] . This example is significant because it is nontrivial to capture enough of the essence of any straightedge-and-compass construction to be able to produce a mathematical contradiction when the construction is impossible. Thus, for a general impossibility proof of unconditionally secure QBC, one would expect that the general essence of any such protocol would be extracted to yield a contradiction. Clearly the impossibility proof does not do that, but rather relies on the claim that any possible QBC protocol can be reduced to its formulation. It is not a priori impossible to exhaustively describe and classify all operations of a certain kind, say, in quantum key distribution one typically characterizes all possible attacks Eve can launch. However, it is much more difficult to characterize all possible protocols than all possible attacks for any cryptographic objective because an arbitrary interactive flow of information between users is possible in a protocol. Indeed, no characterization of all protocols for a specific objective is known in standard (classical)
cryptography. The scope problems of the impossibility proof are numbered as follows.
(1) One justification for the all-encompassing nature of the formulation is that Adam is proceeding exactly as if he were honest, except right before opening, in carrying out his EPR cheat. This is not true because there is no need for him to entangle anything in an honest protocol. He can just pick a |φ i or |φ case. An example is provided by QBC2. (6) It is clearly possible to avoid EPR cheats, as in the example described in Section I.
While (IP) holds in this case, it holds not because of EPR cheats. The question is: why is it that an EPR-cheat-free protocol necessarily cannot satisfy (US)? Protocol QBC2 is an explicit example that (US) is possible in such a protocol.
(7) It is not clear why perfect verification is necessary, the only performance measures here being the cheating probabilities. This freedom in a QBC protocol is exploited in QBC3. The list could be continued. Note that the burden is on the impossibility proof to resolve these points in its favor with convincing arguments, which have not been provided. Indeed, all three protocols QBC1 to QBC3, and even protocol QBC01 to a lesser extent, lie outside the framework of the impossibility proof, and no impossibility argument has been given for this kind of protocols. While there are various underlying reasons on the limited scope of the impossibility proof formulation, a major one is that the interactive flow of information between Adam and Babe may prevent cheating because of each party's lack of relevant information at any particular stage of the protocol. Such information flow is what makes the Yao model of two-party protocols [24] not sufficiently specific to characterize all QBC protocols, which he did not claim to have done. Furthermore, modification of the Yao model to have measurements at the end of the commitment phase, perhaps thought to be equivalent by the Lo-Popescu theorem [25] , is not justified with the use of anonymous states because the state needs to be known to guarantee the validity of that theorem. The basic problem of a general impossibility proof lies in the characterization of the essence of any possible QBC protocol that makes it insecure. The information flow problem that makes it so difficult to characterize all classical protocols surely carries over to the quantum domain.
There are well-known and widely accepted claims in the literature [26] - [27] that classical noisy channels would make unconditionally secure bit commitment possible. While I believe the specific protocols described in [26] - [27] are not proved unconditionally secure, I also be-lieve unconditionally secure ones can indeed be based on noisy channels, a subject to be discussed elsewhere. Such results are not considered to be contradictory to the QBC impossibility proof presumably for the following reasons. First, classical noise is often thought to be part of an imperfect channel, i.e. it does not have to be present in principle. Apart from the points made at the beginning of this section, such a viewpoint is not correct. The quantum noise in any given quantum signaling scheme for classical communication, the minimum amount of which is determined through the optimum quantum measurement via quantum detection theory, is in principle unavoidable and functions exactly like classical noise in the optimal quantum detector [28] - [29] . As will be shown elsewhere, this crucial point opens up the possibility of developing unconditionally secure, practical, and efficient optical-speed cryptographic systems for all the standard cryptographic objectives via quantum states that are not superpositions of one another. Secondly, a truly classical noise system would not entail the possibility of quantum entanglement and EPR cheating. However, there are many ways to suppress EPR cheats, such as the example in Section I and the QBC2 in Section VI. While it is not easy to restore unconditional security with such suppression in a perfect channel, a noisy channel, even one created with quantum noise, would provide a powerful way for such restoration. Indeed, the development of such protocols will be the subject of a future treatment.
V Protocol QBC1
In this Section we consider the use of anonymous states in a QBC protocol which is essentially the one in version 1 (v1-v3) of this paper. In this protocol QBC1, the bit value is encoded in the parity of a sequence as in QBC0 of Section II, except that each individual state is (ii) Adam commits via the parity of the sequence j = (j 1 , . . . , j n ) ∈ {0, 1} n by applying U lj l to |ψ l for openly known U l0 and U l1 , with ψ l |U † l1 U l0 |ψ l = λ > 0 independently of l. (iii) Adam opens by revealing his j sequence. Babe checks every state U lj l |ψ l . This scheme can be made concealing exactly as in QBC0, (14)- (15) . As for its binding behavior, consider first the situation in which Adam can only entangle each qubit individually. He cannot switch any committed U l0 |ψ l or U l1 |ψ l to any other state due to local state invariance which applies to each of the states he sends separately for that state, expressing the obvious fact that there is no entanglement to a single state. If he were to entangle U l0 |ψ l or U l1 |ψ l to another state anyway, he would just present a mixed state for that qubit to Babe for that j l . In this case, a different criterion needs to be used as discussed below. If he sticks to committing first a correct state for the bit, the best cheating probability he can get it
by generating any sequence of n − 1 states, picking the last one for the bit commitment, and declaring it to be otherwise when desired. From (15) and (23), one can make P Adam can, however, form the entanglement without knowing the |ψ l 's, by applying the
with initial state |A ∈ H A satisfying √ p i = e i |A , as was indicated in version 1 of this paper. On the other hand, contrary to the claim in that version, Adam can also entangle qubit by qubit via, for each i = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) in (25) ,
By applying (24)- (25) 
for complete orthonormal sets {|f i } and {|g i } on H A . Define the unitary operators U 0 , U 1 and U 2 by
Since one can always pick H A to be isomorphic to H B , one can identify them via the isomorphism. Let U be the unitary operator for the polar decomposition of ρ
Then
where T denotes the transpose operation. Thus, when ρ . In terms of the notation for (13)- (14), the density operators are
which is unknown to Adam through the |ψ l uncertainty. If Adam picks a cheating transformation for a particular |ψ l sequence, and then the |ψ l sequence is randomly varied, it is easily seen that the resulting P A c can be very small, as e.g. when the corresponding oddparity state is actually of even parity. However, it is not easy to develop an unconditional security proof because Adam has many other possible actions, including committing states which are not exactly correct for the bit value as mentioned above. Nevertheless, the protocol clearly shows in a simple way that the impossibility proof fails to work as intended.
Note that this anonymous-key strategy also works in the case ρ
is not highly degenerate, e.g., not proportional to the identity I B , such that its eigenstates cannot be readily determined as in the case of (33). Indeed, for n = ∞ the ρ 
VI Protocol QBC2
In this section, protocol QBC2 is developed with a complete unconditional security proof by exploting the following point: the states ρ B 0 and ρ B 1 that enter into (7) are not necessarily the marginal states obtained from (1)-(2) due to Babe's lack of information built into a QBC protocol. This situation is actually easy to obtain, but then Adam can usually cheat successfully with this information. The anonymous-key technique can be utilized to prevent both Adam and Babe from cheating to yield an unconditionally secure protocol to be explained in successive steps as follows.
In anonymous-key encryption [12] , Babe transmits to Adam a state |ψ only known to When she learns the state name from Adam's opening, she knows the corresponding state for each bit value and can verify by measuring the corresponding projection. The actual permutation of the S 0 -states in S has to be hidden from Adam because if he knows, he can cheat by committing any state in S and announcing it to be another appropriate state from
S.
Consider first Adam's possibility of cheating. When he picks a specific named state |λ j j , he cannot apply the EPR cheat as a consequence of local state invariance or the fact that there is no entanglement for a singla state. He can announce a different name of the state from the one he actually sent, with a probability of successfully reversing b (i.e. getting it accepted by Babe in her verification) given by 3/4.. He can use his own state instead of the one sent by Babe; the best way to do that is by trying to determine which name corresponds to which state in S by optimally processing the set S from M-ary quantum detection theory (cf. Appendix A). In each case he attains a probability of success bounded away from zero. Let p A be his maximum probability of success, which is determined by the optimal M-ary quantum detector because his openings amount to a decision making that consists in matching each λ j with an element of S 0 . The exact value of p A is not relevant for the security proof of our final protocol. The only relevant point here is that p A is a fixed number less than one. Hence, in an independent m-sequence, his probability of successful cheating,P 
which is not a random permutation of S 0 , then there is a probability p 1 that it will pass
Adam's testing verification,
and a corresponding optimum probability p 2 that Babe can determine the bit knowing the qubit is from S ′ . The value of p 2 is determined by the optimum binary quantum detector. + ǫ where ǫ is bounded away from zero, i.e. not arbitrarily small as a function of n, and send enough of them so that the chance that one of them is picked as j 0 by Adam is also not arbitrarily small for large n. In such a situation where Adam retains one of Babe's cheating state sets which constitute a nonzero fraction γ of the total number n, the probability that Babe's cheating would not be found out is
, assuming Adam indeed sets aside one of the cheating state sets, which goes to zero exponentially. This argument is essentially correct and will be presented rigorously in the more general situation of the protocol in the following. Here we tried to indicate the simple intuitive picture of the situation, and the fact that our scheme so far already contradicts the (IP) statement, although it falls short of the (US) statement. It should be evident that regardless of whether (US) can be obtained in this kind of schemes, the are not covered by the formulation of the impossibility proof.
Were Babe found to be cheating, the protocol would of course abort, which is equivalent to one party aborting in the middle of any protocol, something each party can always choose to do. Thus, our scheme is no different in this respect from any other cryptographic protocol and is essentially different from the cheat-sensitive QBC protocols [10] in that it has nothing to do with detecting possible cheating by Adam and Babe after Adam commits as prescribed in the definition of cheat-sensitive protocols. Indeed, Adam can discover the cheating before he commits the bit. Even though he could postpone the cheating detection measurement in our protocol, such a move would have betrayed his bit to Babe, cf. point (4) in Section IV. More significantly, the cheating probabilities were not quantified precisely in Ref. [10] -presumably if the successful cheating probability is bounded away from zero, then so is the cheat-detection probability. In the present case, arbitrarily small successful cheating probabilities can be obtained in the next protocol, the parameters n, m of which are determined as shown in the following security proof. . The probability that k of these N sets fall into the m choices by Adam is given by the hypergeometric distribution,
The probability that none of these N sets fall into the chosen m group is P 0 (N, n, m), a decreasing function of N and an increasing function of n. Let m be the smallest integer that
The idea is that N must be large enough that at least one of the N sets needs to fall into the m group to getP B c > 1 2 , but then by making n large, N would have to be so large that the probability P u that Babe's cheating sets are undetected becomes too small. Recall thatP B c is the optimal probability Babe succeeds in identifying the bit from measurements on m committed qubits. It will be shown that the condition
would imply P u ≤ ǫ by proper choice of n, thus ensuring unconditional security. Since Babe must have at least one of the N sets picked up by Adam among his m sets in order to satisfy
By equating the upper and lower bounds (36) and (37) onP
where f is defined through P 0 (N, n, m) and is an increasing function of n. For any N, n,
can be made arbitrarily small with n large. Thus, N can be forced to be arbitrarily small from (38) with n sufficiently large. If there is an a priori maximump 1 among the qubits in the N sets, which is proved in the following, one would have
. So n can be chosen to make N large enough from (38) to yieldp
To put an a priori limit on p 1 independent of n and less than one, consider first the case where all qubits in the N sets have the same underlying S ′ so that Babe knows what measurement to make on each. Let P (S ′ , m) be the optimum probability that Babe succeeds in identifying b from measurements on the m qubit sets. Thus, P (S ′ , m) is a continuous function of the S ′ that gives rise to the p 2 as it is a trace norm of the states from (A4). (All norm topologies are equivalent in finite-dimensional spaces). In order for (36) to be satisfied, one must have
for some ǫ > 0. The maximum p 1 that Babe can have is determined among all the qubit sets S ′ that satisfy (39) and 1 ≥ P (S ′ , m). The maximump 1 = max S ′′ p 1 (S ′′ ) exists for the following reason. Thus the set of S ′ obeying (39) and P (S ′ , m) ≤ 1 is closed and thus compact. The function p 1 (S ′ ) of (34) is continuous. The existence ofp 1 thus follows from the Weierstrass theorem. That is, a maximump 1 is achieved by some S ′ 0 in the constraint set and sop 1 < 1. Now suppose Babe has formed entanglements among the sets she sends to Adam. The N sets are defined according to whether each marginal state, as checked and modulated by Adam, would have p j1 = 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, instead of P (S ′ , m) one has P (S ′ , m) that includes optimization over all possible entangled states S ′ , which provides an upper bound toP B c and is still given through the trace norm (A4).
by definition of the N-set. Thus, the existence ofp 1 < 1 follows as in the uniform S ′ j case. We have now exhausted all possible actions by Adam and Babe. In order to execute this protocol in accordance with the above proof in choosing m and n, one needs to know p A andp 1 . These appear to be difficult to obtain analytically, and numerical solutions would need to be used in an actual implementation. In such a situation, the above technicality on the existence ofp 1 < 1 would not occur. While it is easily shown that no four large-energy coherent states can approximate the behavior of the four BB84 states in S 0 , it may still be possible to develop large-energy coherent-state implementation of this protocol because not all properties of the BB84 states are needed.
VII Protocol QBC3
The points (7)- (8) properly to the other n − N qubits. Condition on the parameters will be given.
PROTOCOL QBC3
(i) Adam sends Babe a sequence of n qubits, each in either one of {|φ , |φ ′ }, and commits b via the parity of the sequence with uniform probability.
(ii) Babe randomly picks N out of n qubits, randomly measures either |φ φ| or |φ ′ φ ′ | on each, and keeps the results secret from Adam.
(iii) After Adam reveals the sequence commitment, Babe verifies those states that match among the N measured qubits and the n − N unmeasured ones.
The protocol can be made concealing as in QBC0 and QBC1, but Adam can now cheat in more ways. Similar to QBC1, he can pick one qubit and announce it otherwise, which now has a higher probability of success because of Babe's measurements. From the union bound on the probability of two possible events,
Thus one may pick
similar to (23) and also
so that P 
he would need to entangle n ′ = O(m log m), so that the resultingP 
where |Φ ′′ 0 is the cheating entangled state from |Φ 0 after Babe made her N qubit measurements as follows. The state |Φ ′′ 0 can be written, from (5), 
VIII Conclusion
I hope this paper leaves no doubt that not only is there no general impossibility proof for unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment, but that, in fact, an unconditionally secure QBC protocol has actually been provided. The intuitive reasons and a complete proof that QBC2 satisfies (US) have been described in Section VI. The protocols QBC1 and QBC3,
while not proved to be unconditionally secure in this paper, already demonstrate the failure of the impossibility proof given in the literature. Additional gaps of the impossibility proof are indicated in Section IV and can be exploited for further secure QBC schemes.
Some comments on the practicality of our protocols are in order. Protocols QBC0, QBC1, and QBC3 can be readily implemented with large-energy coherent states. However, there is a sensitivity problem that results from | φ|φ ′ | ∼ 0, which obscures the difference in practice between the two cases of detection for verification versus cheating corresponding to the cases when the state is known or unknown. An investigation into sensitive detection schemes would be timely. Also, it is expected that this and other practical difficulties can be alleviated by the use of error-correcting codes or hash functions more complicated than parity. Perhaps a large-energy coherent-state scheme similar to QBC2 can also be developed.
Another promising avenue is the utilization of the irreducible quantum noise in quantum signal detection schemes to achieve unconditionally secure bit commitment. 
Appendix A Quantum Detection Theory
Quantum detection theory [13] , [28] is concerned with the determination of the optimum quantum measurement and the resulting optimum performance for discriminating a finite number M of alternative hypotheses according to a given performance criterion linear in the density operators ρ j , j ∈ {1, . . . , M}, describing the quantum states of the different alternatives. It has not been used in the previous quantum cryptography literature other than my papers [12] , [19] , [32] , [33] , although it actually has a crucial role, especially in QBC.
Thus, Babe's optimum probability of cheating is given by the optimum binary quantum detector for ρ is positive semidefinite). The hypothesis i is chosen correctly from the measurement result with probability trΠ i ρ i , so that the total probability of correct decison is given by
In M-ary hypothesis testing, (A1) generalizes to
where the
An operator τ is called trace-class if its trace norm τ 1 ≡ tr √ τ † τ is defined (finite); thus all operators on finite-dimensional spaces are trace-class. Density operators are trace-class.
The optimumP C2 among all POM's can be written as follows.
Lemma A1:
Proof: Write p 0 ρ 0 − p 1 ρ 1 = σ + − σ − , the positive and negative eigenvalue parts, so that
and (A4) follows. 2
For two pure states, |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 , (A4) reduces to
The use of "information" e.g. as in Ref. [34] , is not sufficient in QBC because it is not the relevant performance measure, and the optimum detectors forP B c and mutual information are usually not the same. Indeed, generally in cryptography, the use of mutual information is often not sufficiently precise because it has only asymptotic significance in a noisy system, and at least Eve has no possibility of coding. Thus, the performance resulting from attacks by Eve or by cheating among users in QBC should be measured by their respective probabilities of success. In some cases, including many quantum key-distribution situations, the mutual information could be used to bound the successful eavesdropping probability. But even in those situations the resulting system design may be overly pessimistic when the mutual information criterion is employed.
An important condition whose validity seems clear intuitively is thatP C2 = 1 in binary quantum detection if and only if the states satisfy ρ 0 ρ 1 = 0, i.e. the ranges of ρ 0 and ρ 1 are orthogonal subspaces of the state Hilbert space. The "if" part is immediate and the "only if" part, which follows from (A5) when ρ 0 and ρ 1 are pure states, seems to be a consequence of the general no-clone theorem. Specifically, one would be able to clone two nonorthogonal states if one could discriminate between them perfectly. However, the unitarity argument used for no-cloning is not sufficient to include measurement transformations -at least many physicists believe that a quantum measurement transformation with a specific reading is not describable by a unitary transformation on any larger Hilbert space. Nor is linearity sufficient. Thus, the impossibility of perfectly discriminating nonorthogonal pure states, expressed as ρ 0 ρ 1 = 0 for general mixed states, is a separate property to be demonstrated, indeed even just for completing the no-clone argument. That such a property can be demonstrated from quantum detection theory, as done below, appears to me to be another manifestation of the "magical unity" or consistency of the quantum formalism.
The proof of the following theorem generalizes a finite-dimensional proof for the case λ 0 = λ 1 = 1 first communicated to the author by Masanao Ozawa. 
Let ρ 0 have the spectral decomposition ρ 0 = n ν n |φ n φ n |. Then (A13) implies n ν n φ n |V |φ n = 1.
Since 0 ≤ ν n ≤ 1 and n ν n = 1, if ν n = 0 we have Re φ n |V |φ n = 1 and hence V |φ n = |φ n .
Let 
Appendix B Local State Invariance
The local state invariance theorem is conceptually significant and has a simple proof. , none appears to be as complete and simple as the proof just given. In particular, the impossibility of cloning quantum states in some such proofs is not sufficient to establish the impossibility of superluminal communication.
